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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 4, Number 18 (November 15, 1999) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Yel'tsin hospitalized again 
President Boris Yel'tsin has once again been hospitalized with pneumonia, but 
the government has become so effective at working around the president's 
persistent health problems that the only thing thus far postponed by his absence 
appears to be the signing ceremony for the Russian-Belarus pact. The Kremlin 
has, nonetheless, felt the need to deny that the president was suffering from a 
"diplomatic flu." 
 
One of the president's physicians, Dr. Sergei Mironov, attempting to head off 
rumors that the president's health is seriously impaired, asserted that Yel'tsin 
should be "finished with treatment within 7 to 10 days." (INTERFAX, 1517 GMT, 
26 Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
 
Putin supports unity 
While Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's recent announcement of support for the 
political movement "Unity" generated strong criticism (primarily from the Luzhkov-
allied media), President Yel'tsin has signaled his approval of the move by 
reiterating his support of the prime minister. Announcing that he was pleased that 
Putin was thinking about the upcoming elections, Yel'tsin surmised that Putin was 
allying with a faction "on which he can rely in his policy." (INTERFAX, 1918 GMT, 
28 Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
 
Concerns that the upcoming elections will result in a Duma that challenges the 
Putin government seem to be driving a sense of executive consolidation around 
a single political movement. That the chosen faction is Emergency Minister 
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Sergei Shoigu's "Unity" faction holds little surprise, as its creation appeared to 
have solid presidential and apparat support. The fears of a newly elected Duma 
confronting Putin seem unfounded, however. Putin's popularity has soared on the 
strength of the Chechen campaign, and public opinion does not appear ready to 
swing back unless there is an egregious defeat of Russian forces at the 
Chechens' hands. 
 
Livshits on budget 
Aleksandr Livshits, Russia's representative to the G-8, claims that the military 
action against Chechnya has not caused budgetary stress. Livshits did concede, 
however, that if the Chechen campaign drags on, problems could surface. In an 
attempt to reassure those wavering on IMF funding to Russia, Livshits 
emphasized that upcoming tranches were meant to relieve debt service and 
would not even pass through Russian banks. Livshits did not address the 
possibility that IMF funds for debt service could free up other money for use in 
the Chechen war effort. (ITAR-TASS, 0051 GMT, 3 Nov 99; via World News 
Connection) 
 
Cossacks ride in 
In a move certain to reassure no one, the Russian government is aiming to insert 
Cossack troops into the North Caucasus to reinforce the armed forces in their so-
called war against international terrorism. The Cossack units are not established 
military formations, but will rely on self-organized groups to patrol border regions 
throughout the North Caucasus. (ITAR-TASS, 1400 GMT, 20 Nov 99; via World 
News Connection) 
 
Rosvooruzhenie projects billions in orders 
Alexei Ogarev, general director for Rosvooruzhenie, has announced that the 
state arms company expects its orders through the year 2005 will total $9 billion 
and could possibly reach $17 billion. Ogarev admits that the projected orders 
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may not be realized, but they do represent a reasonable estimate. (ITAR-TASS, 
2054 GMT, 23 Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
 
Putin on integration 
Despite a decade's worth of economic advice and engagement, Prime Minister 
Putin recently claimed that Russia "is not ready for successful integration into the 
world economy." (INTERFAX, 1303 GMT, 23 Nov 99; via World News 
Connection) While Putin's remarks will hardly be regarded as a repudiation of the 
Yel'tsin presidency's focus on economic reform efforts, it does represent a 
significant rhetorical departure in Russia's relations with Western economic 
institutions. 
 
In a related story, Kremlin economic manager and vice president of the 
International Union of Economists, Pavel Borodin, cited Federal Security 
Services sources in claiming that more than $1 trillion has left Russia illegally 
since the era of perestroika began. (INTERFAX, 1002 GMT, 23 Nov 99; via 
World News Connection) Borodin advocates a Duma initiative to amnesty the 
capital flight in the hope that some of those who stashed funds abroad would 
decide to return some monies to Russia.  
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
New naval doctrine in the works 
The formulation of a new military doctrine has apparently prompted an inter-
forces debate over the primacy and purpose of individual branches of the 
Russian armed forces. At a recent Security Council meeting, a decision was 
reached to draft a new doctrine for naval forces in an effort to bring the navy's 
mission in line with the new overarching military doctrine and also to rationalize 
increased budgetary expenditures on naval hardware. (INTERFAX, 0905 GMT, 
23 Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Preparing a putsch? 
The moment passes, the crisis unwinds. For all the fears of conflict at the 
Istanbul meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the leaders of Russia and the United States returned home to claim that 
cooler heads had prevailed. The US administration took pride in shepherding four 
international agreements to signature -- a revised Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty, a summit declaration that made reference to Chechnya, a Charter for 
European Security founding a rapid reaction civilian force, and a list of 
confidence-building measures. 
 
In the run-up to the summit and at the height of talks, leaders of the United 
Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and states as diverse as 
Croatia and Pakistan had criticized Russia for its brutal attacks on Chechen 
civilians and its ominous moves in the South Caucasus. Clutching a fistful of new 
treaties, however, the US administration declared victory and, after a self-
congratulatory tour of southeastern Europe, went home. Still, the White House 
may have had more cause for satisfaction concerning business it had done on 
the side -- signing a deal with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey to promote an oil 
pipeline which could help the countries in question, were it to be built.  
 
As the war in Chechnya continued, and Russia still complained of Georgia's 
alleged collusion with its foes, the agreements Russia had signed with the West 
began to look hollow. Was there anything in all the rhetoric and revisions to 
discourage Russia from overthrowing the Georgian government? The answer, 
sadly, was no. If anything, agreements to bring civilians into a conflict as 
negotiators and monitors promised Russia a clean-up crew if a putsch in Georgia 
should succeed. 
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Who is fomenting a new Cold War? 
The day before the OSCE convened its meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov tried to play on the White House's worst fears. Writing in The Financial 
Times, Ivanov worried that Russia's efforts to move beyond "the abyss of the 
Cold War" would come to naught, and accused NATO states of using the conflict 
in Chechnya as a pretext to promote an "anti-Russian campaign" that was "in the 
best traditions of the recent past." The campaign, Ivanov wrote, even undermined 
Russia's confidence that the West would comply with the documents it was to 
sign. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 16 November 99; via www.financialtimes.com) 
 
Given Russia's failure to adhere to earlier versions of the documents to be 
revised (BEHIND THE BREAKING NEWS, 1 Dec 99; via 
www.bu.edu/iscip/bbn.html), Ivanov's bluster might be dismissed as mere 
chutzpah. But his preemptory accusations that the West was reviving the Cold 
War served a purpose -- to shield Moscow from the same charge. In the week of 
the summit, after all, Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev accused the 
West of conspiring to limit its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, while 
the head of Russia's air force warned that "Russia is not Iraq, nor is it 
Yugoslavia" and would "deal decisively with any interference." (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 17 Nov 99, and Reuters, 17 Nov 99) Who, one might 
have asked, was actually heightening tensions -- Russia or the West? 
 
Pulling the OSCE's punch 
Ivanov's article also set the standards for the OSCE summit -- anything short of 
signatures on all agreements would be tantamount to reviving the very "Cold War 
mentality" that US administration officials dread. It was hardly a surprise, then, 
that the White House put more emphasis on getting pen to paper than on 
shaping the texts it signed. As a result, the documents that were agreed upon 
deflated the criticism of Russia that had been growing worldwide, and did little to 
secure Europe's most vulnerable states. 
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For all of Russia's huffing and puffing -- including the early departure of President 
Boris Yel'tsin from the conference's proceedings -- the war in Chechnya was 
mentioned only once, and then according to Moscow's characterization of events. 
In Section 23 of the Istanbul Declaration, nations that had earlier dismissed the 
campaign against terrorism as a Russian ruse agreed instead to "acknowledge 
the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and condemn terrorism in all its 
forms." 
 
Similarly, the declaration's pledges to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians 
were clouded with caveats such as "creating appropriate conditions." No reason 
was given why Moscow couldn't argue that subduing the Chechen rebels is one 
such condition, or that a Russian military victory was not the best way to create 
the "conditions for stability, security, and economic prosperity in the region" that 
the declaration promised. (ISTANBUL SUMMIT DECLARATION, Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 19 Nov 99; via www.osce.org) 
 
The Russian concession most highly touted by the White House -- a pledge to 
allow OSCE Chairman Knut Vollebaek to visit Chechnya -- proved empty in the 
following weeks. Stopping in Moscow to prepare a trip south, Vollebaek found 
himself cooling his heels while Ivanov pleaded that such a dangerous journey 
was difficult to arrange. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 30 Nov 99) Who 
now, one might have wondered, could be accused of violating pledges made in 
Istanbul? 
 
The US administration was also proud that Russia signed a revised version of 
the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, since under the new version 
Russia must remove troops stationed in Georgia and Moldova. The White House, 
however, made no special effort to ensure Russian compliance with the treaty, 
despite Russia's long-standing violation of existing limits and its insistence that 
troops in Moldova's breakaway province of Transdniestr and Georgia's Abkhazia 
protect minorities. Given the OSCE's emphasis on "peacekeeping," Russia was 
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left with the chance to use purported threats against local populations as an 
excuse to leave its troops in place. 
 
Indeed, the summit's "Charter for European Security" established more 
instruments to pursue the policies of "peacekeeping" behind which Russia has so 
successfully disguised previous moves. Praised as a new means by which the 
OSCE could intervene across international boundaries, the Rapid Expert 
Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) are meant to enable the OSCE "to 
respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations." 
But as an entirely civilian force of "experts" trained in "conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation," the REACT forces appear to have 
been given an acronym that is all too apt. (CHARTER FOR EUROPEAN 
SECURITY, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 19 Nov 99; via 
www.osce.org) As the experience of Bosnia showed, such grief counselors are 
typically allowed to deploy only once hostilities have ended. 
 
A Russian-promoted coup in Georgia would no doubt give the OSCE's experts a 
great deal of "post-conflict rehabilitating" to do. But would the threat of their 
deployment deter Moscow from seizing power over a region it covets? 
 
Read it as you please 
With a little help from administration spin-doctors, the Western media heralded 
the president's comparison of Chechen civilians to Boris Yel'tsin's predicament 
during the 1991 coup. "If they had put you in jail instead of electing you 
president," Clinton told Yel'tsin, "I would hope that every leader of every country 
around this table would have stood up for you, and for freedom in Russia, and 
not said, 'well, that is in an internal Russia affair that we cannot be part of.' " (UPI, 
18 Nov 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Russian media chose to highlight a different aspect of Clinton's speech, one that 
undid a growing worldwide consensus that Russia could no longer hide behind 
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the excuse of fighting "international terrorists." (THE NIS OBSERVED, 15 Nov 
99) "Clinton declared that the world wants Russia to overcome the evil of 
terrorism and lawlessness," ITAR-TASS, the Russian state news agency, 
announced. "Russia does not merely have the right, but it must defend its 
stability, the US president declared." (ITAR-TASS, 18 Nov 99; via World News 
Connection) 
 
If, as some feared, Russia engineers a coup against Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze in the coming months, the highly touted pipeline deal across the 
Caucasus will be worth as little as the security measures signed in Istanbul. If 
"lawlessness" is combated in Georgia on the pretext of "fighting terrorism," 
Russia no doubt will claim that it perceived the US president's words as a green 
light. 
 
Russia's anti-western diplomacy 
During the second month of the battle in Chechnya, Russia received some rather 
noteworthy foreign dignitaries, including Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and 
Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. These trips come at a time when Russia is 
earnestly aiming its "multipolar policy" specifically at Islamic countries.  
 
This week's separate visits by both Yasser Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister 
David Levy, as well as last April's Russo-Palestinian summit have served to 
highlight Russia's reinvigoration of its participation in the peace process. 
(XINHUA, 29 Nov 99; via lexis-nexis) Russia has a keen diplomatic interest in 
securing an active role in the Middle East peace process. Since 1991 Russia's 
role in the actual negotiations has been marginal, but during Arafat's visit ways of 
intensifying Russian involvement in the peace process topped the agenda. 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) For Russia, which does 
have a historic role in the Middle East and old ties with the Palestinian 
leadership, rejoining the process now could give a much-needed boost to 
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diplomatic prestige. In this sense, Russia seems prepared to claim a mostly 
Western and Middle Eastern diplomatic win as its own.  
 
Russia's interests in Iraq are both political and economic. During last winter's 
Anglo-American bombing, Russia used "anti-unilateral action" rhetoric to gain 
support from China and other non-Western countries. Throughout the UN 
Security Council debate over the Iraqi sanctions, Russia and China have stood 
together, demanding an end to the bombing, withdrawal of the unduly hard-line 
US stance, and a total removal of sanctions.  
 
But Russia's interests in Iraq extend far beyond diplomatic prestige. Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Tariq Aziz's visit was partially an economic appeal to Russia, who is 
Iraq's largest creditor and the would-be recipient of lucrative oil deals once the 
sanctions are lifted. (REUTERS, 2 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) Even without these 
deals Russia remains a loyal buyer. Under the currently limited Oil-for Food 
Program, Russia plans to purchase an additional 150 million barrels of Iraqi oil. 
(INTERFAX, 1529 GMT, 18 Nov 99; via World News Connection) Through these 
deals, Russia acts as Iraq's key political and economic lifeline against their 
mutual enemy: the West.  
 
In light of the bad publicity that its Chechen campaign has produced, Russian 
diplomacy is searching for much-needed foreign policy "wins" wherever possible. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Spas movement election registration revoked 
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Russian Justice Minister Yuri Chaika got his way. Moscow's Zamoskvoretsky 
district court revoked the election registration of the extreme Spas (or Salvation) 
political movement on 12 November. Grounds for disbarring the movement were 
that the founding documents for its regional offices contained distortions and 
falsehoods. Spas claims it will appeal the decision to the Moscow City Court and, 
should that fail, continue by appealing to the international court in Strasbourg. An 
additional concern, if not the primary reason for Minister Yuri Chaika's opposition 
to Spas, is that at its core sits Alexander Barkashov's neo-Nazi Russian National 
Unity party. It seems ironic that a racist, xenophobic party would appeal to an 
international body born out of the brutal failure of European fascism. (INTERFAX, 
1914 GMT, 12 Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
 
Zhirinovsky's Bloc political platform aired 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky's party running for office, the aptly named Zhirinovsky's 
Bloc, has aired a political ad characteristic of his peculiar world view. Noting that 
Russia needs to sell its products to anyone who will buy, Zhirinovsky proposes 
expanding trade with such upstanding members of the international community 
as Iran, Iraq and Libya. He says that the future of Russian trade is not with the 
world's richest countries, but with others where Russians "goods are needed." 
 
Additional ideas include: the re-establishment of a state monopoly on alcohol, 
tobacco, and sugar, and an amnesty on money taken out of the country illegally, 
which Zhirinovsky believes will encourage Russians to bring their money home. 
He also said that the 89 regions which make up the federation should be 
abolished and the country re-organized into provinces (guberniyas) which would 
presumably be run directly from Moscow and prevent the harboring of all kinds of 
groups such as the "Wahhabites" in Tatarstan. 
 
In a more lucid moment, Zhirinovsky suggests taxes be lowered to help small- 
and medium-sized businesses get on their feet, which in turn will provide a great 
number of jobs. "This will train everyone to pay taxes in an orderly manner. We 
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may lose some revenue, but people will begin to live better and we will get the 
money that is lacking by trading more intensively with the South." 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, Electronic Version, 18 NOV 99; via World News 
Connection) 
 
Recent polls suggest that the Zhirinovsky Bloc will not overcome the five-percent 
hurdle required to make it into the Duma on the party list, although a few 
Zhirinovsky supporters, and even Zhirinovsky himself, may win seats in the 
single-member districts. What does seem to be happening is that Zhirinovsky is 
becoming the most respectable voice among the nationalist extremists. However, 
if he and his party cannot garner even five percent of the vote, what would that 
say about his party, his person, and his message?  
 
Yel'tsin and Primakov are the center of the campaign debate 
Although 28 parties/movements have been registered to run for election, only two 
real poles drive the debate: the Primakov and the Yel'tsin camps. The 
Communists might win 20 percent of the vote, but their message is fractured and 
perhaps exhausted. It is telling that, unlike 1995, Yel'tsin's electoral message has 
framed not the Communists as the threat to the Russian future, but Primakov and 
Luzhkov. The Communists may remain a party large enough to reckon with for a 
time to come, but they no longer control the terms of debate and are becoming 
increasingly marginalized. This is not to say that the alternatives are necessarily 
better -- witness the rise of neo-fascists -- only that this election may be 
remembered as the first post-Communist election in Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1345 
GMT, 24 Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
 
The primary issue, whether spoken or not, is who will replace Yel'tsin next June. 
Primakov seems to be the most likely choice, and for this reason all parties in the 
election are running against Yel'tsin and Primakov. However slight the relative 
philosophical differences between a Yel'tsin/Putin presidency and that of 
Primakov might be, this seems to be the major ideological or personality divide 
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with which Russian voters must make their decision. (INTERFAX, 1821 GMT, 22 
Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
 
LDPR electoral registration reinstated 
The Central Electoral Commission voted to reinstate Zhirinovsky's Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) electoral registration in response to a 
Supreme Court ruling requiring it to do so. The CEC also removed Zhirinovsky's 
name from the LDPR list. The commission reversed its own decision of 11 
October, when it disqualified the LDPR because of irregularities found in the 
registration documents submitted by several members on the party list.  
 
This now means that there are two Liberal Democratic slates: Zhirinovsky's Bloc 
and the LDPR. Electoral law forbids candidates from being on two federal slates 
at once, so members of one of these slates are going to have to resign, thus 
invalidating that party's registration. If members of Zhirinovsky's Bloc resign in 
favor of the LDPR list, the bloc's registration is invalidated, and so is 
Zhirinovsky's chance for entering the Duma on a party list. (He could, of course, 
still win a seat in a single-member district.) Should this happen, the LDPR, shorn 
of its leader, would not stand a chance of reaching the five-percent hurdle for 
entering the Duma -- not that this is likely anyhow. Members were given 24 hours 
to make up their minds. If list members decide to remain with the Zhirinovsky 
Bloc, things return to the status quo ante.  
 
Although Zhirinovsky threw a fit in front of the CEC when the decision was 
announced, commission chair Aleksander Veshnyakov noted that Zhirinovsky 
had been informed of the CEC's decision a day earlier. Veshnyakov claims that 
the histrionics and threats of appealing, again, to the court to invalidate the 
eventual elections is a public relations stunt aimed at putting Zhirinovsky back on 
the map. "Another paper, Segodnya [3 Dec 99], thinks that the Central Election 
Commission managed to diffuse the mine planted under the parliamentary 
elections. Alexander Veshnyakov was certain that Zhirinovsky had been given a 
 13 
go-ahead for appealing to the Supreme Court after the voting in order to 
invalidate its results if they failed to please the Kremlin. The Commission 
preempted this move by re-registering the LDPR slate and dropping Zhirinovsky 
from it." (KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 3 Dec 99; Russian Press Digest, via lexis-
nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr and Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
The Russian navy: past, present, or future? 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, in his continuing quest to woo military brass, 
pledged to restore the Russian navy to its former glory. The navy's precipitous 
decline over the past decade was a hot topic of discussion at the Russian 
Security Council meeting on 21 November. At the meeting Putin complained 
"The trend of driving Russia out from the world ocean is obvious.... Russia 
became a great power only after it became a sea power." Putin promised to draft 
a presidential decree on the modernization of the Russian navy. (TASS, 23 Nov 
99; via lexis-nexis)  
 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Klebanov, who is responsible for the 
defense industrial sector, presented a plan for the modernization. The navy's 
share of the defense budget would double from 9 to 20 percent, with priority 
being given to maintaining the nuclear submarine forces. Due to financial 
constraints, no new surface ships will be built prior to 2007-08, therefore a key 
element of Russia's sea doctrine will be protecting economic and security 
interests in coastal zones, not dominating world's oceans. (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 24 Nov 99) 
 
However, the Russian navy reminisces about the glory days of the Soviet era. 
Following the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, the Russian navy performed 
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some high-profile military chest pounding aimed at the US. In August an Oscar-
class submarine entered the Mediterranean Sea for the first time in four years 
and simulated attacks on a US carrier battle group. The American ships chose to 
ignore it. In September, for the first time since 1997, another Oscar-class 
submarine shadowed US ships off San Diego, Hawaii, and the Pacific Northwest. 
On 17 November, the eve of the OSCE summit in Istanbul, a Typhoon-class 
submarine in the Barents Sea launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles to a 
distant target on the Kamchatka Peninsula for the first time since 1995. The 
submarines' tactics revived Cold War memories, however their activity is far less 
intense. Western analysts believe Russia has only 20 operable nuclear 
submarines, compared to 200 at the height of the Cold War. (THE 
WASHINGTON POST, 18 Nov 99) Even in this financially lean period, the 
Russian navy is experimenting with fixed wing maritime strike aircraft operating 
from their only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. (DEFENSE NEWS, 13 Sep 
99) Defense analysts believe these signs of weakness merely reflect the military 
leadership's frustration at its inability to determine world events. 
 
In the interim, Russian arms manufacturers have turned to the export market 
instead of waiting for the navy to buy new equipment. The Vympel shipyard is 
building a new missile boat for export, and India has agreed to buy Russia's 
latest sea-launched cruise missile, the SS-NX-27, NATO code-name "Alpha." 
(THE NIS OBSERVED, 18 Oct 99) The Alpha is an advanced, potentially lethal, 
third-generation cruise missile which has not even entered Russian military 
service. (DEFENSE WEEK, 29 Nov 99) 
 
Russia's defense priorities are now confusing. Officials have pledged to maintain 
their strategic rocket forces, rebuild the army, modernize the navy, and even pay 
special attention to "military aerospace." Russia aspires to world influence via 
military power, but does not possess the financial resources to satisfy all 
branches of the military. Putin's budding friendships with the military leadership 
may face future strains when he doesn't deliver on all promises. (Jamestown 
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Foundation MONITOR, 23 Nov 99)  
 
Russians enter third phase of Chechen operations 
General Valery Manilov, deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, announced 
on 27 November that Russian troops had completed the second phase of 
"antiterrorist operations" in Chechnya and are now beginning phase three. This 
third phase, he said, will involve the final extermination of the "terrorist bands" in 
the Chechen mountains; the restoration of civilian control, normal life and 
adequate conditions for Chechens returning to their homes; and the securing of 
the border with Georgia where Russian officials believe the rebels have their 
escape and supply routes. The objectives of the first and second phases were to 
"liberate" the Chechen plains. (INTERFAX, 0953 GMT, 26 Nov 99, and ITAR-
TASS, 0350 GMT, 27 Nov 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-
nexis) Senior military officials expect to complete this phase by the end of the 
year but have hinted that operations could continue for up to three more months. 
(INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 27 Nov 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Military spokesmen say their third phase strategy is to send soldiers into the 
mountainous southern part of Chechnya to find and destroy rebels, their 
strongholds and arms caches. Until now the primary strategy of the Russian 
troops has been to minimize direct contact with the "Chechen rebels," instead 
employing aerial and artillery bombardment to destroy rebel-controlled Chechen 
cities and villages, thus minimizing Russian losses. With the initiation of this third 
phase, the Russian troops must now come face-to-face with the rebels and 
casualty counts can be expected to rise sharply.  
 
In the meantime, Russian troops say they have completed their encirclement of 
the capital and announced on 6 December an ultimatum to civilians to leave the 
city by 11 December or face destruction. Anyone remaining in the city after that 
date would be considered a terrorist and killed. Russian aircraft are dropping 
leaflets over the city announcing the ultimatum and identifying a security corridor 
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out of the city allowing civilians to leave safely. After the deadline, the Russians 
will increase their unwavering assault against Djokhar with "more powerful, 
cutting edge weapons and equipment." By some accounts these weapons will 
include incendiary munitions and fuel-air bombs which explode above ground but 
exert enough pressure to kill people below ground. (BBC WORLD NEWS, 6 Dec 
99; via National Public Radio, and THE INDEPENDENT (London), 26 Nov 99; via 
lexis-nexis) There are an estimated 50,000 Chechens left in Djokhar. 
 
Continuing casualty reporting 
To convince the Russian public of the success of current Chechen operations, 
officials continue to portray Russian casualty counts as minimal. But as troops 
begin to come into more direct contact with "Chechen rebels" under the planned 
third phase, the casualty counts can be expected to climb. Already the numbers 
are growing as a result of fierce fighting last week following an announcement by 
Chechen field commander, Shamil Basaev, that his forces will begin a major 
counter-offensive. (INTERFAX, 1449 GMT, 26 Nov 99; via World News 
Connection) As the numbers are made public, more analysts are beginning to 
draw parallels with Russian casualties reported during the Soviet campaign in 
Afghanistan, 1979-89. According to official figures, the Russian military is losing 
about 130 troops per month, a rate comparable to the monthly death toll of Soviet 
troops during the long, unsuccessful Afghanistan campaign. The current casualty 
counts are reported by Russian officials as anywhere between 279-462 dead and 
756-1,485 wounded since August and include dead/wounded during operations 
in both Chechnya and Dagestan. (BOSTON GLOBE, 20 Nov 99; ITAR-TASS, 
1500 GMT, 12 Nov 99; via World News Connection) Casualty figures for 
Chechen fighters, mainly coming out of Russian channels, are not considered to 
be reliable. 
 
In one report, Russian military officials admitted 12 out of 14 paratroopers had 
been killed and two captured during a reconnaissance mission on 17 November. 
This number was the largest reported by Russian commanders from a single 
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battle with the Chechens. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 29 Nov 99; via lexis-
nexis) Coincidentally, a Chechen officer stated on 22 November that some 200 
Russians were killed in an ambush of a reconnaissance patrol the week before 
and backed up this claim with a video showing at least 43 bodies in Russian 
uniforms. Ali Dudarov, the Ingush deputy interior minister, later supported reports 
of this incident and the casualty count based on his discussion with Russian 
officers. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2013 GMT, 22 Nov 99; via World News 
Connection; WASHINGTON POST, 3 Dec 99) Despite the conflicting information, 
the casualty figures reported by Russian officials are almost universally believed 
to be underestimated for political and propaganda reasons. For example, one 
method being used to skew the figures is to portray death totals as only those 
troops killed directly in combat and not those soldiers who die from their wounds 
later in hospital. The soldiers in the field are already nervous, complaining that 
they are fighting an "invisible enemy." One soldier says "It only seems like there 
is no one inside, but let anyone approach and the bullets come flying at us from 
every direction, from every ruin." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 1502 GMT, 1 
Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
 
Show me the money 
With the estimates of Chechen operations continuing at least until the end of the 
year and, more recently extended for possibly another three months, Russian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced on 23 November that several billion 
rubles were to be transferred from the Federal Road Fund to the defense sector. 
The State Duma had agreed to this reallocation of a total of R5.5 billion from the 
road budget to the military in order to pay for operations in Chechnya. (ITAR-
TASS, 1456 GMT, 23 Nov 99; via World News Connection)  
 
And after the fat lady sings... 
Nikolai Koshman, deputy prime minister and Russia's representative in 
Chechnya, announced on 12 November that a Russian division would be 
permanently based in Chechnya. This formation, according to Defense Minister 
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Igor Sergeev, would consist of a combined forces division, probably stationed in 
the Chechen settlement of Chervlennaya, and a tank regiment at Shali. Also 
included would be several units from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Justifications 
for this troop basing are the reported atrocities carried out by rebels against 
Chechen civilians and as assurance against the reemergence of "terrorist" 
activity. (ITAR-TASS, 1512 GMT, 27 Nov 99; via World News Connection) 
Reports say the 106th Tula Airborne Division will represent the core of these 
permanently based forces. (VREMYA MN, 1 Dec 99; Defense and Security, via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
GUUAM waxes and the CIS wanes 
Could the CIS be in worse shape? As one initiative after another is not 
implemented, and each summit succumbs to polarization, even the Russian 
leadership, which always praises its pet project, has little enthusiasm for the CIS. 
This "vitally important" organization, as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin calls it, 
"didn't become an alliance" and is now "largely formal." (INTERFAX, 22 Nov 99; 
via lexis-nexis)  
 
From the beginning, the CIS has been unable to see through its integration 
initiatives; since last summer, it has become increasingly polarized. Russia has 
always treated the CIS as its post-Soviet domain and now it is searching for a 
scapegoat as the CIS loses ground. Russia usually initiates most of the finger 
pointing against those that resist its leadership within the CIS and look elsewhere 
for new, viable partnerships. Putin has blamed "foreign" geopolitical meddling, 
while others have blamed GUUAM, the westward-leaning group of CIS states 
(Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova).  
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According to the Russian media, the moribund state of the CIS was especially 
apparent just before the OSCE Istanbul summit. In the end, CIS polarization 
precluded a common stance going into the summit. (KOMMERSANT, 27 Oct 99; 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press) This Customs Union versus GUUAM 
split has typified CIS relations since GUUAM members began to assert 
themselves within the CIS. Also, GUUAM's success at economic and strategic 
coordination has only irritated Russia. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 4 Aug 99) Even 
without a formal organizational structure, GUUAM members have shown 
solidarity not only in terms of the CIS, but also as an independent association of 
states. And despite their initial unwillingness to be perceived as a "military bloc," 
GUUAM rhetoric no longer hides behind its economic role. Instead, its rhetoric 
stresses its strategic and economic "consultative" role. (BBC, 22 Nov 99; via 
lexis-nexis) In practice, GUUAM is falling into its strategic cooperation role well; 
the group concluded several meetings over the past six months and scheduled a 
GUUAM foreign ministers meeting in Tbilisi for January 2000. (ITAR-TASS, 21 
Nov 99; via lexis-nexis) GUUAM's shift in rhetoric and policy emphasis seems to 
indicate that it has matured over the past year and has begun to take a stronger 
stance within the region vis-a-vis Russia and the CIS. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Out in the cold I 
Because of Ukraine's inefficient power production and the country's massive 
debts to its gas-providing neighbors, many observers predicted that this winter 
would be an exceptionally difficult one for the country. They could not have 
predicted that the problems would begin so soon, however, thanks to the 
remnants of a cyclone that hit the country at the end of November.  
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By 23 November, snow and ice had begun falling on southern Ukrainian towns. 
By 24 November, almost 3,000 towns in the Dnipro area were completely without 
power. Public transportation was stopped, the railroads were barely running, 13 
local airports were closed and telephone service was almost completely shut 
down. The Ukrainian Ministry for Emergency Situations told ITAR-TASS that the 
regions of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhya were hardest hit by the storm, with 
more than 11,000 electrical substations out of order. (ITAR-TASS, 25 and 26 Nov 
99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Also according to the emergency situations ministry, 13,000 people worked to 
clear the roads in towns along the southern portion of the Dnipro River, as the 
storm finally began to clear on 26 November. Although there are no current 
reliable estimates of homes or towns still without power, the number is apparently 
substantial. And, although there are rumors that at least two people have died 
either as the result of electrocution from fallen wires or from falling trees, those 
rumors have not been confirmed. (ITAR-TASS, 0726 GMT, 25 Nov 99; via World 
News Connection) 
 
This latest weather crisis has only added to the country's deepening energy 
problems. The country's five nuclear plants, which supply between 40-50 percent 
of Ukraine's energy, have been undergoing a rash of shutdowns, both planned 
and unplanned. The latest shutdown was due to a reactor malfunction and came 
on 2 December at the Chernobyl plant. That plant's one functioning reactor was 
only restarted on 26 November, following five months of routine, annual repair. It 
reached its maximum generating capacity on 29 November.  
 
Officials said that the Chernobyl reactor suffered a malfunction in its emergency 
cooling system, but that no increase in radioactivity was registered. (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 2 Dec 99; via Russia Today) This emergency shutdown 
follows another at the Khmelnytskyy power station in October after a 
transmission line was damaged. (UNIAN, 1400 GMT, 18 Oct 99; BBC Summary 
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of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) The country was recently also forced to shut 
down at least one reactor due to a lack of fresh fuel, and has taken a number of 
reactors off line for yearly upkeep.  
 
Put this all together, and what you get are shortages, which can lead to tragedy. 
On 1 December, a patient in the western Lviv region apparently died during an 
operation when power went out during his surgery. In another hospital, doctors 
reportedly performed a recent Caesarean section by candlelight. (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 1 Dec 99; via Russia Today) And the West wonders why 
Ukraine needs Chernobyl's one reactor that produces just five percent of the 
country's electricity.  
 
Out in the cold II 
Today's riddle: What talks a lot, snubs the leader of the second biggest country 
on the European continent, insults two countries on two continents with one 
sentence, and discourages a newly independent state from instituting Western-
style reforms in a single bound? The European Union's commissioner for 
enlargement, Guenter Verheugen, of course.  
 
On 25 November, Verheugen responded to President Leonid Kuchma's oft-
repeated request to be considered for a place in the European Union. "We are 
counting on a signal from the European Union that if we achieve the 
Copenhagen criteria (for EU accession), our state will be viewed as a future 
candidate for membership in the European Union," Kuchma told the Financial 
Times on 23 November. "Of course, ... we rely first and foremost on our own 
efforts. But, ... support of the European Union would hasten this process .... It is 
very important that the West listen to us," he said. Kuchma was hoping to be 
invited to the EU Helsinki summit to discuss the matter.  
 
Apparently, Verheugen had different ideas. Not only was Kuchma not invited to 
the summit, even though the union is completing a new "Common Strategy on 
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Ukraine," but his request was ridiculed. "I think it is irresponsible," Verheugen 
said, "to talk about Ukraine and Russia as if they are potential candidates for 
membership. I think anybody who thinks Ukraine should be taken into the EU ... 
should perhaps come along with the argument that Mexico should be taken into 
the US." (REUTERS, 25 Nov 99; via Russia Today) Of course, Kuchma did not 
talk about Russia, and the US is a country, not a union of countries, but why 
quibble over semantics?  
 
There has been no response from Leonid Kuchma to Verheugen's remarks. It 
cannot be helpful, however, to his ability to pass reform legislation or to fight 
leftist tendencies in the country. In his inaugural speech, Kuchma tied the need 
for faster reform to entry into the EU. "Confirming our European choice," he said, 
"we consider our entry into the EU to be our strategic goal. Requirements for 
future EU members coincide greatly with actions planned to be taken in this 
country." (FIRST PROGRAMME, 2000 GMT, 30 Nov 99, BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Without that carrot, will Ukrainians continue to 
support reform?  
 
BELARUS 
Much ado about nothing much 
Well, they finally made it. The question is, what did they make? On 8 November, 
amid much pomp and circumstance in Moscow, Presidents Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka and Boris Yel'tsin signed the much ballyhooed, and much delayed, 
Union Treaty. There is only one problem -- the document contains little that was 
not already part of the outline for unity signed on 25 December 1998 by the 
presidents. 
 
The Union Treaty speaks of both countries "moving toward ... unification of 
legislation, tax policies, customs and border controls," but makes only one 
concrete plan -- the establishment of a joint military doctrine. (UPI, 1239 EST, 8 
Dec 99; via lexis-nexis, and INTERFAX, 1744 GMT, 7 Dec 99; via World News 
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Connection) Even this provision, however, simply follows up on nine previous 
military agreements signed earlier this year. (The NIS OBSERVED, 18 Oct 99) 
 
In reality the treaty signed this week does little more than demonstrate what 
limited progress has actually been made toward forming the type of union 
originally outlined almost one year ago. On 25 December 1998, Interfax 
explained the original "unification plan" step by step, detailing what would happen 
almost immediately in the process. "In February, a special agreement should be 
signed that will regulate prices and tariffs on goods and services in transport, 
communications, energy and gas industries. Also in February, the pricing 
principles of the two countries should be standardized." In addition, a plan should 
be implemented "to secure the mutual convertibility of the two currencies. 
(INTERFAX, 1318 GMT, 25 Dec 98; via World News Connection, and THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 13 Jan 99)  
 
Almost one year later, those goals seem more distant than ever. The "union" is 
still but a dream in Lukashenka's active mind. Russia, however, has made great 
strides in fulfilling what must have been a major, if not the only, goal in this union 
strategy -- its military control has been extended to Belarus' westernmost border. 
It cannot be a comforting thought in Ukraine, or in any of the western former 
Soviet republics. But, no doubt, for Russia, this small military victory must indeed 
be quite satisfying.  
 
MOLDOVA 
A win for the president -- and no one else 
Thanks to the governmental crisis that he helped to precipitate, President Petru 
Lucinschi has now managed to make himself the most powerful man in Moldova 
and increase his likelihood of winning the upcoming presidential election. 
Unfortunately, he had to stand back while the cabinet fell, destroy the ruling non-
Communist coalition, and nominate a prime ministerial candidate who had a 
limited chance of being confirmed in order to do it. Also unfortunately, the people 
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of Moldova will likely be the ones paying for the president's power play, as the 
government remains stagnant, and international organizations respond by 
freezing all loans to the country. 
 
Over the last year, Lucinschi repeatedly attempted to increase his power -- at the 
expense of the prime minister and cabinet -- by changing Moldova's form of 
government to a presidential republic. At every turn, however, he was blocked by 
the parliament. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 15 Nov 99) Even worse, Ion Sturza, the 
Moldovan prime minister since February, was able to build a favorable reputation 
slowly both within and without Moldova, thus challenging Lucinschi's supremacy. 
Lucinschi began to solve these problems in November by allowing the 
Communist Party, in a coalition with the Popular Front and with the support of six 
"independent" pro-presidential deputies, to topple the government. He solidified 
his position by nominating Communist Party First Secretary Vladimir Voronin as 
the next prime minister. Almost immediately, it became clear that it would be 
difficult to acquire the necessary 52 votes to confirm Voronin -- a fact that 
Lucinschi must have known before Voronin was nominated. And, on 7 
December, parliament indeed rejected Voronin's candidacy. Thus, the parliament 
has now refused to confirm two prime ministerial candidates, giving Lucinschi the 
right, under Moldova's constitution, to disband parliament and call for new 
elections.  
 
Shortly after the vote, Lucinschi appeared "solemn," according to Reuters. 
(REUTERS, 7 Dec 99; via America Online) One day before the vote, his press 
secretary said, "The president believes an early election would be the most 
undesirable variant for the country at the moment." (INFOTAG, 1900 GMT, 6 Dec 
99; via World News Connection) On that same day, however, Lucinschi 
explained that if parliament is not able to form a government, parliamentary 
elections would be necessary. Interfax noted that Lucinschi "stressed that his 
initiative to change the constitution with a view to strengthening presidential 
power was aimed at making the country more stable." (INTERFAX, 1222 GMT, 6 
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Dec 99; via World News Connection) Of course, Lucinschi can, if he chooses, 
nominate a third candidate, but he has indicated that he does not wish to do so. 
 
Lucinschi's pieces have come together seamlessly. Unfortunately, the seams in 
Moldova's economy and social welfare system are becoming more evident each 
day to the persons who live there. They have been without a government for a 
month and are suffering energy and food shortages. One would hope that 
Lucinschi is able to create a strategy to deal with these problems that will be as 
effective as his strategy for becoming the most powerful man in Moldova. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Who in the world is Beslan Gantemirov? 
The latest news reports from Chechnya indicate that the federal forces have 
taken control of Urus-Martan, a key Chechen stronghold, with the aid of militia 
leader Beslan Gantemirov, the new head of the State Council of Chechnya.  
 
When he reemerged on the scene in early November, the nationalist Russian 
paper Segodnya relished the news: "The appearance in the theater of operations 
of Chechen patriots ready to clear their homeland from bandits and terrorists will 
beat the main propaganda card of the opponents of the 'anti-terrorist operation.' 
As is common knowledge, they view it as an aggression, whereas the coming of 
Gantemirov will give it the status of 'a liberation war.'" (SEGODNYA, 6 Nov 99; 
via lexis-nexis)  
 
So who is this Chechen patriot whom the Russians have chosen to lead the new 
government of "liberated" Chechnya?  
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A former policeman turned black-marketer, Gantemirov made his debut on the 
political scene in 1991. Together with Yaragi Mamodaev, an oil man later 
accused of corruption, and Yusup Soslambekov, a convicted rapist, Gantemirov 
built up his "Islamic Path" party, actually a paramilitary group, eventually merging 
it into Djokhar Dudaev's National Guard. In Dudaev's government he was made 
mayor of Grozny. His tenure there was characterized by Western observers as 
an "epitome of mafia government." [CHECHNYA: CALAMITY IN THE 
CAUCASUS (New York: 1998)]  
 
In 1993, when Dudaev attempted to curb the degree of corruption and theft, 
Gantemirov broke definitively with him and joined the opposition. By 1994, 
defeated by Dudaev, Gantemirov teamed up with the FSB and led several minor 
skirmishes against Dudaev's forces. The final infamous rout of his rebel band in 
November 1994 was the trigger that set the Russian invasion into motion. After 
Dudaev repelled that offensive, taking Russian tank crews prisoner in Grozny, 
Russian General Pavel Grachev made his over-eager promise to defeat Dudaev 
in two weeks. As far as the war went, Gantemirov was not heard from again. 
 
He next resurfaced in Moscow in 1996 where he was arrested, tried, convicted 
and sentenced to six years on embezzlement charges, in connection with oil 
theft. In November 1999, Yel'tsin pardoned him, plucked him out of jail and sent 
him to "liberate" Chechnya. 
 
Aside from being precisely the kind of "bandit" and "criminal" the Kremlin is 
supposedly fighting in Chechnya, Gantemirov seems to be allied with "wahhabis" 
to boot. Urus-Martan, whence he hails, was a center of radical Islamic agitation 
against President Maskhadov. In 1998 there were inconclusive clashes there 
between the locals and the Maskhadov loyalists. This week the Russian 
government apparently used Gantemirov's appeal with the Urus-Martan radicals 
to win the town from the Maskhadov fighters. 
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That the combined forces of the interior and defense ministries are not deemed 
sufficient to defeat roughly 6,000 Chechen fighters was apparent from the start, 
when the Russian side started using the newly formed Dagestani militias. Then 
Cossacks were brought into the fray. War might make for strange bedfellows, but 
isn't an alliance with a convicted felon who draws his strength from the most 
radical elements in Chechen society going a bit too far? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Kazakhstan wins financially, but loses politically after second rocket crash 
On 18 November, nearly a month after a second Proton rocket crashed on 
Kazakh territory, the Russian government agreed to pay $400,000 in damages 
for any environmental destruction caused as a result of the crash. Although this 
is considerably more than Russia paid after the rocket collision last July, it came 
at a high price for the Kazakh government. During his 18 November meeting with 
his Russian counterpart in Astana, Kazakhstan's Deputy Prime Minister 
Aleksandr Pavlov ceded his country's right to ban any future launches to the 
Russian Aerospace Agency. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 22 Nov 99) As a result, 
Kazakhstan has lost significant leverage in the negotiations over the Baikonur 
lease agreement, thus far for few tangible returns. The Russian government has 
yet to pay a single installment of the five years' backrent owed for its use of the 
cosmodrome. Following last July's rocket crash, Kazakh negotiators were able to 
use the launch ban to force Russian officials to pledge that their administration 
would pay $50 million of the 1999 rent by the end of December, but none of 
these funds has reached Astana yet. Now that the Kazakh government can no 
longer use the threat of a launch ban to exact even the promise of payment, it 
seems unlikely that Russia will settle its debts regarding the Baikonur 
Cosmodrome in the near future.  
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Will Russian separatists' arrest in Kazakhstan raise inter-ethnic tensions? 
Kazakh security ministry forces took 22 armed men into custody on 19 
November, all of whom were charged with participating in a conspiracy to 
overthrow local authorities in Ust'-Kamenogorsk (in Kazakhstan's easternmost 
territory). The men allegedly planned to declare the city and its surrounding 
oblast' the "Independent Republic of Russian Altai." All of the men are ethnic 
Russians, but only 10 of them are Kazakh citizens; the rest hold Russian 
citizenship. It is believed that they were able to obtain backing from a number of 
influential local inhabitants. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 23 Nov 99) Five days after the 
men were detained, Nezavisimaya gazeta reported that the group's ringleader, 
Vladimir Kazimirchik, had spent the past two months attempting to rally support 
among the local population for his plan to secede from Kazakhstan. Oblast' 
security personnel repeatedly received warnings from local administrators 
regarding Kazimirchik's activities, but ignored them until the end of November. 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 24 Nov 99) 
 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev has made an effort to minimize the 
incident as much as possible, stating that he views the matter as a purely 
criminal case with no political overtones. He also told journalists that he does not 
expect the men's arrest to affect Kazakhstan's relations with the Russian 
Federation. President Nazarbaev's press secretary further assured the media 
that the country's Russian minority would not be subjected to increased security 
measures as a result of the incident. However, local security officials in Ust'-
Kamenogorsk have reported that quite the opposite is taking place there. 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 29 Nov 99) 
 
It remains to be seen how Kazakhstan's population will react to this incident. For 
most of his tenure, President Nazarbaev has advocated a policy of coexistence 
between his country's still sizable Russian minority and its various Turkic groups; 
prior to the Soviet Union's collapse, Kazakhs were actually a minority in their own 
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republic, outnumbered by the Russians and other Slavic groups. Overall, 
Nazarbaev's policy appears to have been successful, but tensions still exist, 
particularly in areas where one group seems to enjoy marked economic 
advantages over the other. Many of Kazakhstan's industrial regions are still 
heavily populated by Russians, who consequently may be perceived as unfairly 
maintaining a monopoly on a large portion of the country's resources and profits. 
Ust'-Kamenogorsk is in a part of the country known for its mining industry. The 
appearance of a Russian secessionist movement there, which may have had the 
support of prominent local residents and perhaps even the backing of local 
security organs, could ignite the fear that much of northeastern Kazakhstan is in 
danger of breaking away. A number of politicians and other leading figures (e.g., 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn) in the Russian Federation 
have publicly advocated the return of northern Kazakhstan to its rightful owners, 
the Russians. At this point it seems doubtful that the Ust'-Kamenogorsk group 
had outside assistance from the likes of Zhirinovsky or Solzhenitsyn, but even a 
rumored connection may be sufficient to spark violent conflict. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Soviet-style political repression reported to be alive and well 
According to Tolib Yaqubov, the general secretary of the Uzbek Human Rights 
Society, Soviet-style methods of torture and harassment are still commonly used 
by Uzbekistan's law enforcement authorities during the interrogation of 
detainees. In mid-November, Mr. Yaqubov traveled to Geneva, where he testified 
before a UN panel on human rights violations in Uzbekistan. He also delivered a 
written report to the UN Committee Against Torture in which he described typical 
methods used by the Uzbek police and interior ministry personnel. In an interview 
on Iranian radio shortly before he left for Geneva, Mr. Yaqubov explained that 
Uzbek law enforcement officials often resort to torture in order to obtain 
confessions from their prisoners. Convicts who violate prison rules are frequently 
subjected to physical abuse as well, as a form of punishment. (VOICE OF THE 
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ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1500 GMT, 3 Nov 99; via World News 
Connection) 
 
In addition to relying on various methods of torture to intimidate and terrorize 
detainees, Uzbek authorities also continue to imitate the Soviet practice of 
situating prison camps in the most geographically inhospitable parts of the 
country. One such penal colony is located on the Ustyurt Plateau, near the town 
of Jaslyq in western Karakalpakistan in a region which the Soviet army once 
used for weapons testing. Radiation levels are abnormally high in the area 
surrounding the camp and, according to Mr. Yaqubov, at least 38 inmates of the 
Jaslyq camp have died so far this year. The Uzbek government has admitted to 
the camp's existence, and claims that 6471 people are incarcerated there; Mr. 
Yaqubov believes the number is closer to 15,000. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1500 GMT, 31 Oct 99; via World News Connection) 
 
Mr. Yaqubov's statements about the existence of the Jaslyq prison camp and its 
ecologically hazardous environment have been corroborated by Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki researcher Cassandra Cavanaugh (TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER, 
22 Oct 99) and Amnesty International has issued numerous reports describing 
the physical torment and other forms of harassment that suspected opposition 
members and their families have endured. The Uzbek government itself makes 
no secret of the fact that hundreds of people have been arrested on suspicion of 
their links to either the secular or Muslim opposition. Given all of this evidence, it 
seems absurd for Western leaders to continue speaking of Uzbekistan as a 
nascent democracy. Regardless of how often Uzbek administrative officials may 
reiterate their commitment to building a politically open society and protecting 
their citizens' civil rights, in fact, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Uzbekistan has become one of the most repressive dictatorships in the former 
Soviet Bloc.  
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Fortunately, Western leaders could easily exert pressure on the present Uzbek 
leadership to change its ways, if they so chose. Uzbekistan is currently 
dependent on international investment and aid programs to develop a viable 
economy and any threats which Western officials might make to curtail their 
financial assistance would surely not fall on deaf ears. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Miller 
 
Interference in internal affairs? I'm shocked 
With all the sincerity of a Casablancan police officer expressing outrage that 
gambling is occurring as he pockets his own illegal winnings, Russia has 
remonstrated against Baltic leaders' comments concerning the bombing 
campaign in Chechnya, claiming such statements constitute interference in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign country. During the OSCE summit in Istanbul, 
Baltic leaders such as Latvian Prime Minister Andris Skele and Estonian Prime 
Minister Mart Laar called upon Russia to stop its offensive in Chechnya and seek 
a negotiated solution. Estonian President Lennart Meri stayed away from the 
summit to protest the OSCE's inefficiency and lack of resolve in dealing with the 
Chechen issue. At home, Lithuanian Seimas Speaker Vytautas Landsbergis 
decried the weakness of the summit's declaration concerning the war. "I got the 
impression that Chechnya had been abandoned for destruction, as Western 
leaders failed to come up with something more specific and more strict," he said. 
Estonia's Riigikogu passed a statement strongly condemning Russian actions 
with a vote of 57 to 1, and no abstentions. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE reports, 18-
22 Nov 99)  
 
The response from Russia has been one of supreme irritation. "[P]oliticians are 
trying to teach us how we should manage our affairs in the Northern 
Caucasus...," Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin said, branding 
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statements by leaders and parliamentarians as "impermissible interference in the 
interior affairs of Russia." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 
GMT, 23 Nov 99) 
 
While Russian leaders protest the passage of parliamentary statements seeking 
an end to the attacks on Chechen civilians, they apparently have forgotten their 
own concerted efforts to influence discussions on state language laws in Latvia 
and Estonia this past year. Such attempts still have not ended: Recently, the 
Russian Duma adopted a bill on the imposition of economic sanctions against 
Latvia in response to the internal affairs of that Baltic country. The bill is the 
Russian lawmakers' response to the national language law which is due to be 
passed in the near future in Riga, according to Anatoly Chekhoev, vice chairman 
of the Duma's Committee for the Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and Relations with Compatriots. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1600 GMT, 16 Nov 99) Moreover, the Duma called on the international 
community to highlight "gross violations of the international law in Latvia," in a 
statement (passed with 258 votes against one) that criticizes the proposed 
language law, which is due to be discussed this week in the final reading. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1400 GMT, 19 Nov 99) 
 
Meanwhile, one of the leaders of the Russian Citizens Union in Estonia, Pyotr 
Rozhok, who is campaigning for a seat in the Russian Duma on the For the 
Soviet Union party ticket, outlined his election platform which would, in effect, 
seek to increase substantially Russian interference in the internal affairs of 
Estonia. Rozhok seeks to bring back to Estonia persons who were "forcibly 
expelled," return to Russians property which had been taken from them, and 
abolish boundaries, visas and taxes which are being collected on what he 
describes as ancient Russian property. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1400 GMT, 15 Nov 99) 
 
ESTONIA 
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Court performance verdict: operating so as to endanger 
Justice Minister Mart Rask gave the country's court system a highly critical 
evaluation and warned that society could be imperiled in a letter he sent to Uno 
Lohmus, chairman of the State Court. At issue primarily is how long many cases 
take, since habitual delays undermine the court's authority, the minister said. He 
cited 926 civilian cases which last year were dragged over 12 months, while 
nearly one-fourth of all criminal cases took over six months to conclude. "If the 
administration of justice doesn't work, the society will find other, non-judicial ways 
for doing justice, in the form of a lynch law," Rask warned. A "notion is gaining 
ground among ordinary citizens that no protection can be expected from court," 
he added. Lohmus agreed with Rask's concerns, but warned that an investigation 
into the causes of these delays would determine whether bad organization, 
excessive workloads of judges, procedural norms or some other reason was 
responsible. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1100 GMT, 10 Nov 99) 
 
LATVIA 
Commission work yields no improvement in corruption perception 
Despite active attempts by the government to address the situation, a perception 
of extensive corruption remains in Latvia, according to a recent poll by the 
Latvian Center of Criminology Studies. The results indicate that 65.6 percent of 
persons responding said that corruption was widespread in the country, while 40 
percent believed corruption to be exceedingly widespread. In fact, out of the 404 
persons questioned, only one said corruption was very scarce in Latvia; none 
described corruption as scarce. Still, some level of optimism could be found: 
Nearly one-half of the respondents stated that corruption could be curbed to 
some degree, although less than 5 percent said the scourge could be eliminated 
entirely. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 4 Nov 99)  
 
The fight against corruption has remained high on the government's agenda for 
years. A report prepared by EU experts found problems at all levels of the 
Latvian government. (OMRI DAILY DIGEST, 19 Dec 96) The following year, 
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Prime Minister Andris Skele announced that "The fighting of corruption has to 
become one of the main jobs of the state and all people responsible for the use 
of state funds must be aware that their activities will be scrutinized very closely." 
(REUTERS, 7 May 97; via Clari.Net) That effort had shown little evidence of 
success by last year, when a poll conducted by the international anti-corruption 
organization Transparency International (TI) indicated that businessmen, 
international experts and the public believed that Latvia had a high level of 
corruption in comparison to other countries. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1000 GMT, 23 Sep 98) Results of research by the World Bank a few 
months later indicated that the abuse of power was expanding. The authorities 
most affected by corruption are the customs and road traffic police, but the 
reason underlying the spreading corruption was seen to be the lack of adequate 
restrictions on the competence granted to public servants, the World Bank's 
research indicates. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 1024 GMT, 3 Dec 98; via World 
News Connection) Two months later, however, the World Bank praised Latvia's 
anti-corruption efforts. 
 
Despite a perceived lack of progress in combating corruption, another poll 
indicates that the perception does not affect the willingness of a majority of 
Latvian residents to stay in their country. When asked, most residents said they 
would reject an offer to move permanently to some Western country. According 
to the poll conducted by the Sociali Korelativo Datu Sistemas (SKDS) research 
center, 59.1 percent of the population would rather remain in Latvia, 32 percent 
would accept the chance to relocate, and 8.8 percent were undecided. While 
there were some deviations depending on citizenship, more than half of both 
citizens and non-citizens would opt to stay. The center questioned 2,000 
residents between the ages of 18 and 75 in October. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE 
DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 15 Nov 99) 
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